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Death by a Thousand Cuts or Hard Bargaining?: How the 
Court‘s Indecision in Wilkie v. Robbins Improperly 
Eviscerates the Bivens Action 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
One June day in Wyoming, Frank Robbins received a phone call 
from agents of the federal government demanding an easement on his 
land. Robbins knew nothing of this easement because the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) agents neglected to record the easement when they 
purchased it from Robbins‘s predecessor.1 For several years, BLM agents 
mounted a campaign to harass and intimidate Robbins through increasing 
their supervision of his land infractions, not allowing him to cross federal 
land, videotaping guests at his ranch, and breaking into his ranch.
2
 The 
BLM actions were intended to intimidate and coerce Robbins into giving 
the federal government the public easement. Thirteen years after the 
initial contact between federal agents and a rancher, the case reached the 
United States Supreme Court. Robbins lost his final claim against the 
federal agents as the Court held that no judicial remedy was available for 
the injury that Robbins suffered at the hands of the BLM agents.
3
 
In one of the most influential opinions in American jurisprudence, 
Chief Justice Marshall declared the infamous statement, ―The very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.‖4 
This line of reasoning inspired the monumental decision in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
5
 where the 
Supreme Court created a cause of action for a citizen when a federal 
officer violated his constitutional rights.
6
 Bivens was a judicially created 
right of action against federal officers for violations of federal 
constitutional rights. Because the cause of action against federal officers 
 
 1. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 2593–95. 
 3. Id. at 2604–05. 
 4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 5. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 6. It has also inspired Bivens‘s counterpart—the statutory formulation creating causes of 
actions against state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008). Shortly after the Civil War, Congress 
enacted a reconstruction statute, § 1983, that expressly authorized suits for violation by state officers 
of federal constitutional rights. 
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is not related to a specific constitutional provision, Bivens remedies have 
been controversial.
7
 Bivens was decided in 1971, and in the past thirty 
years, this area of law has undergone major retrenchment. Robbins‘s 
claim fell under Bivens jurisprudence as Robbins sought damages for the 
violation of his constitutional rights by the BLM agents. The Court used 
this case to further limit the ability of courts to grant a Bivens remedy 
against federal agents. 
The ideal maxim expounded in Marbury v. Madison—that for every 
right there is a remedy—is far from true in practical applications of 
modern litigation. Due to immunity doctrines, many injured individuals 
are left without a remedy when the government is the defendant in the 
suit.
8
 Moreover, the complex doctrine of justiciability provides another 
bar to receiving remedies when rights have been violated.
9
 The 
curtailment of the availability of a Bivens cause of action is another 
example in the modern legal system where an individual injured by a 
federal officer has no remedy. It is unclear, however, why federal 
officers should be excluded from paying damages if they violate an 
individual‘s constitutional rights. State actors, for example, are still 
required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to pay damages if they violate federal 
constitutional rights. Because Bivens causes of actions were created by 
federal common law instead of a statutorily defined structure akin to       
§ 1983, Bivens causes of actions have hardly been embraced. 
With the most recent decision in Wilkie v. Robbins,
10
 not much of the 
original jurisprudence established in Bivens remains. Wilkie continues 
the trend of substantially retreating from the original Bivens action. By 
failing to provide a Bivens remedy when the Court conceded that no 
other adequate remedy existed, and by expanding the policy arguments 
for ―special factors counseling hesitation,‖11 the Wilkie decision not only 
prevents the extension of the Bivens remedy, but effectively limits prior 
cases where the remedy has been granted to their facts.
12
 The Court‘s 
 
 7. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 289, 326–28 (1995) (arguing that constitutional rights have come to be vindicated on their own 
terms). See also Jeffrey M. Nye, Holly v. Scott: Constitutional Liability of Private Correctional 
Employees and the Future of Bivens Jurisprudence, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1245, 1270 (2007) (―The 
Bivens remedy is the sole vehicle through which many constitutional violations may be redressed—
no statute, for example, imposes liability on individuals who violate a person‘s Fourth Amendment 
rights.‖). 
 8. See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999) (standing for the general proposition of state sovereign immunity). 
 9. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555 (1992) (standing for the proposition that where plaintiffs lack standing, their case cannot be 
adjudicated even if a wrong has occurred and has not been remedied). 
 10. 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. Id. 
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retrenchment of the availability of the Bivens remedy reinforces the idea 
that as a practical matter not every right has a remedy. The Court avoids 
deciding whether the alternative remedies are adequate to preclude the 
Bivens actions. The Court also avoids deciding whether the BLM agents 
violated Robbins‘s constitutional rights through the series of threats and 
intimidation levied against him. The majority weighs the BLM actions as 
―death by a thousand cuts‖13 at one point and ―hard bargaining‖14 at 
another, and then assumes that the intimidation was not severe enough to 
warrant a remedy. Finally, the Court pronounces that Congress should 
decide whether there should be a remedy for intimidation by federal 
officers.
15
 By avoiding the pivotal decision of whether a right was 
actually violated, the Court changes the analysis to focus on factors that 
allow the limitation of the Bivens remedy in almost any circumstance. 
This note begins with a brief discussion of the principal issues 
discussed in Bivens and then traces the development of the two 
exceptions to the Bivens action that have swallowed the rule. Part III 
discusses the facts, holding, and dissent of Wilkie v. Robbins. Part IV 
argues that the Wilkie decision broadly denies the enforcement of a 
constitutional right and improperly eviscerates the Bivens remedy in four 
ways. First, the Court departs from the most important consideration in 
determining whether a Bivens remedy applies, which is deciding whether 
an alternative remedy exists. Second, the Court adopts an unnecessarily 
broad interpretation of special factors counseling hesitation to include 
concern over opening the floodgates to litigation and the difficulty of 
deciding whether a right was violated that precludes a Bivens remedy. 
Third, the Court improperly declines to decide whether a constitutional 
right was in fact violated before deciding how the severity of the 
violation of the right affects the plaintiff‘s receipt of damages. Fourth, 
the Court improperly bases its denial of the Bivens remedy on concerns 
about legislating, but in doing so, reveals the legislative nature of the 
Bivens remedy itself as being a matter of federal common law. This note 
concludes by discussing the future of the availability of the Bivens 
remedy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13. Id. at 2600 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 40, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 
No. 06-219 (Feb. 20, 2007). 
 14. Id. at 2600. 
 15. Id. at 2604–05. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
The Supreme Court created a private right of action against federal 
officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.
16
 Bivens alleged that 
his arrest by federal officers without a warrant and without probable 
cause was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Charges against 
Bivens were dropped, and Bivens sued the officers who had arrested 
him.
17
 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court‘s dismissal of the 
case and held that when a constitutional right has been violated, federal 
courts will supply all customary remedies for the invasion if there are no 
special factors counseling hesitation or if Congress has explicitly 
provided another remedy that is equally effective.
18
 At the beginning of 
this judicially created cause of action, the Court established important 
exceptions to obtaining a remedy for the violation of a constitutional 
right. In addition, the Court considered only the Fourth Amendment in 
this case and left other constitutional violations and implied remedies for 
another day.
19
 
Perhaps Justice Harlan‘s concurrence in Bivens has had a longer-
lasting impact on the Bivens jurisprudence than the majority opinion. 
Instead of accepting hard-and-fast rules, Justice Harlan saw the issues 
presented by remedying constitutional wrongs as more of a legislative 
matter. He encouraged a sort of balancing test that looks at factors 
contributing to the vindication of the right and factors determining the 
proper remedy for this right.
20
 He wrote the famous mantra of Bivens 
actions: ―For people in Bivens‘ shoes, it is damages or nothing.‖21 The 
lack of alternate remedies seemed to be one of the most important factors 
for Justice Harlan in the need for a remedy against these federal officers. 
Eight years after the Bivens decision, the Bivens remedy was applied 
in two expansive cases. In Davis v. Passman,
22
 the plaintiff, a 
congressional staffer, claimed that she had been a victim of sexual 
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
23
 Congress had 
expressly exempted its own staff from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
she could not obtain relief under the general federal statute.
24
 The Court 
held that a cause of action could be directly implied from the Due 
 
 16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 17. Id. at 389. 
 18. Id. at 396. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 408–10. 
 21. Id. at 410. 
 22. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 23. Id. at 230–31. 
 24. Id. at 247 n.26. 
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan, who authored 
the opinion, explained that if the plaintiff had sued under a statute, then 
her cause of action would depend on congressional intent to create such a 
cause of action. Because the statute did not apply to her, she sued under 
the Constitution, and the decision to imply a private right from the 
Constitution fell to the Supreme Court.
25
 Justice Brennan reasoned that 
because she had no other way to enforce her constitutional right to be 
free from gender discrimination, she must be able to seek relief under the 
Fifth Amendment.
26
 
A year later, the Supreme Court again extended the Bivens action to 
cover the violation of an Eighth Amendment constitutional right. In 
Carlson v. Green,
27
 a mother sued on behalf of her deceased son‘s estate, 
alleging that her son had died because the federal officers had not given 
him adequate care.
28
 The Court reasoned that neither of the two factors 
necessary to refuse a Bivens action existed in the case. The Court found 
that there were no special factors that counseled hesitation in applying 
the Bivens action, but did not expand on what these factors could be.
29
 In 
addition, the Court found that even though the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) provided remedies for certain intentional torts of a federal 
officer, Congress had not explicitly declared the FTCA to be a substitute 
for a Bivens action.
30
 The Court reasoned that the Bivens action was more 
effective than the FTCA remedy and a better deterrent against 
constitutional violations.
31
 Even though the Court did grant a Bivens 
action, the Court specifically provided that a Bivens action would be 
precluded if there were any special factors that counseled hesitation.
32
 
The Court began to restrict the availability of the Bivens action in 
1983 by using the ―special factors counseling hesitation‖ exception 
established in Bivens and reaffirmed in Carlson. In Chappell v. Wallace, 
the Court declined to apply a Bivens action because of special factors 
counseling hesitation.
33
 In Chappell, five enlisted men in the U.S. Navy 
sued their superiors for violating their constitutional right to be free from 
racial discrimination.
34
 The plaintiffs alleged that because of racial 
discrimination, they were assigned to unappealing duties, suffered threats 
 
 25. Id. at 241–42. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 28. Id. at 16. 
 29. Id. at 19–20. 
 30. Id. at 18–19. 
 31. Id. at 23. 
 32. Id. at 18. 
 33. 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983). 
 34. Id. at 297. 
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from superior officers, received harsh punishments, and received low 
performance evaluations.
35
 The Court unanimously found that the nature 
and structure of the military system as a whole was a special factor 
counseling hesitation that would preclude a Bivens remedy. Justice 
Burger wrote for the Court: ―Civilian courts must, at the very least, 
hesitate long before entering a suit which asks the court to tamper with 
the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their 
superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique 
structure of the military establishment.‖36 The Court did not address the 
adequacy of the remedies the plaintiff could receive in the military 
structure, but focused more on the plenary authority of Congress to 
provide for military discipline and review of military matters.
37
 
In Bush v. Lucas,
38
 decided on the same day as Chappell v. Wallace, 
the Court declined to extend a Bivens action to a claim under the First 
Amendment when a federal employee claimed he had been demoted 
because he exercised his First Amendment rights. The Court reaffirmed 
its ability to award monetary damages for a violation of a constitutional 
right, but also found that this power was limited by policy 
considerations. The Court explained the law regarding Bivens actions: 
 
When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may . . . indicate its 
intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or . . . by the 
statutory remedy itself, that the Court‘s power should not be exercised. 
In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must 
make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate . . . paying 
particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling [sic] 
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.
39
 
 
The Court took a larger step in restricting the Bivens remedy by 
broadening the policies that could be considered as special factors 
counseling hesitation. The Court found that Congress had expertise in the 
field of civil service policy and had fashioned appropriate civil service 
remedies for constitutional violations.
40
 Although those remedies were 
not as effective as Bivens remedies, the Court did not desire to intrude 
upon Congress‘s prescribed, meaningful review program.41 The Court 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 300. 
 37. Id. at 302–03. 
 38. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 39. Id. at 378. 
 40. Id. at 388–89. 
 41. See id. at 378 n.14. 
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said that Congress could ―indicate its intent [to preclude Bivens actions] 
by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the 
statutory remedy itself . . . .‖42 Congress‘s expertise in making policy for 
hiring and firing constituted a special factor counseling hesitation. 
A significant retrenchment in courts‘ application of the Bivens action 
using special factors counseling hesitation came again in Schweiker v. 
Chilicky.
43
 In Chilicky, the Social Security Administration erroneously 
discontinued benefits to thousands of people before Congress stopped the 
administration‘s disqualifications of benefits.44 Several individuals who 
were wrongfully denied benefits experienced severe financial hardship 
because of medical costs during this time. They alleged a violation of 
their Fifth Amendment due process rights and sued the officials seeking 
a Bivens remedy.
45
 The Court again denied the Bivens remedy in a 6–3 
decision and applied the special-factors-counseling-hesitation prong. The 
Court reasoned that because Congress had enacted an elaborate scheme 
to review wrongful denial of benefits, it would be improper for the Court 
to apply a non-statutory remedy that would undercut the administrative 
scheme. The Court stated, ―When the design of a Government program 
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial 
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of 
its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.‖46 
Two of the plaintiffs had pursued the administrative remedy and received 
a back payment of the benefits that were denied to them. The Court also 
found that the ―Bivens remedy would obviously offer the prospect of 
relief for injuries that must now go unredressed,‖47 but even though the 
administrative remedies provided for by Congress were not as effective 
as a Bivens remedy, Bivens still could not be applied. Thus, under the 
Court‘s analysis in Chilicky, to preclude a Bivens remedy, Congress must 
have provided some sort of remedy that Congress found adequate. The 
Court did not discuss, however, how meaningful or adequate the remedy 
needed to be to preclude a Bivens action. 
The most recent case before Wilkie to discuss the availability of a 
Bivens action came in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
48
 where 
the Supreme Court refused to apply a Bivens action against a private 
corporation operating a halfway house as a governmental contractor with 
 
 42. Id. at 378. 
 43. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 44. Id. at 416. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 423. 
 47. Id. at 425. 
 48. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
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the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Court had previously held in FDIC v. 
Meyer
49
 that Bivens actions could not be extended to suing federal 
agencies instead of individual officers. Similarly, in Malesko, the Court 
found that a Bivens action could not be applied to private corporations 
acting under a contract with a federal agency.
50
 The Court stated that 
alternative remedies were available, such as the ability to sue the 
corporation under state tort law.
51
 Thus, the progeny of Bivens has shown 
a general retrenchment in the availability of direct damages for a 
constitutional violation by federal officials. Wilkie pronounces an even 
stronger statement about the difficulty of prevailing on a Bivens action. 
 
III.  WILKIE V. ROBBINS 
 
A.  Facts 
 
In 1994, Frank Robbins purchased the High Island Ranch from 
George Nelson. The High Island Ranch is a guest resort stretching across 
almost forty miles of land in Hot Springs County, Wyoming.
52
 The land 
involved in this area of Wyoming is split into parcels owned by private 
individuals, the State of Wyoming, and the federal government. The 
High Island Ranch is near the Rock Creek area, a remote and scenic area 
of Wyoming. South Fork Owl Creek Road runs through High Island 
Ranch and directly up to the upper Rock Creek area.
53
 Because of 
pressure from environmentalists and those who enjoy the outdoors, the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) tried to obtain an easement for the 
public to use this road to connect them to the Rock Creek area.
54
 
Unbeknownst to Robbins, two months before Robbins bought the 
property from Nelson, Nelson had signed a deed of easement giving the 
United States the right to use and maintain the South Fork Owl Creek 
Road. In return for this easement, Nelson had received a right-of-way on 
a different portion of the road to access parts of the ranch.
55
 
Unfortunately, the government neglected to record this easement and 
according to Wyoming law, when Robbins recorded his title to the ranch 
in May, he took ownership of the ranch free of the easement.
56
 In June, a 
BLM official realized the mistake had been made and immediately 
 
 49. 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994). 
 50. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71. 
 51. Id. at 72–74. 
 52. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2592–93. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-120 (2005). 
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demanded that Robbins give the United States the easement. Allegedly, 
the federal officer told Robbins that ―‗the Federal Government does not 
negotiate‘‖ when Robbins asked what the government would exchange 
for the easement.
 57
 Discussion between the two parties broke down, and 
as Justice Ginsburg describes in her dissent, ―the BLM officials mounted 
a seven-year campaign of relentless harassment and intimidation to force 
Robbins to give in.‖58 
BLM officials trespassed on Robbins‘s land to survey the easement, 
federal officers were told to follow possible permit violations by Robbins 
more closely, federal officers allegedly made disparaging remarks about 
Robbins, and officials threatened to cancel the right of way negotiated by 
Robbins‘s predecessor, Nelson. The federal officers later claimed that 
Robbins violated various land use regulations, which Robbins denied.
59
 
They also refused to maintain the public road that Robbins used and 
fined Robbins for trespass when he fixed the road himself, canceled his 
special recreational use permit and grazing privileges, and brought 
criminal charges against him for impeding and interfering with a federal 
employee.
60
 The jury acquitted Robbins in this criminal charge, and a 
news article reported the jury‘s disgust with the government‘s treatment 
of Robbins.
61
 Even after Robbins filed the 1998 lawsuit that reached the 
Supreme Court in 2007, the BLM continued to deny permits, interfere 
with Robbins‘s business, and even videotape female ranch guests as they 
tried to find privacy.
62
 In sum, the Court sifted the difficulties Robbins 
endured at the hands of the BLM into four separate categories: tort-like 
injuries, charges brought against him, unfavorable agency actions, and 
miscellaneous offensive behavior.
63
 
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
Robbins brought the lawsuit in 1998 asking for compensatory and 
punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief founded on 
a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim and 
a Bivens claim.
64
 Under the Bivens claim, Robbins asserted that the BLM 
had violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court 
 
 57. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2593 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 5, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 
S. Ct. 2588, No. 06-219 (Feb. 20, 2007)). 
 58. Id. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 59. Id. at 2494–95 (majority opinion). 
 60. Id. at 2495. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 2610. 
 63. Id. at 2598. 
 64. Id. at 2596. 
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dismissed Robbins‘s claims.65 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded, specifying that the Bivens action was only 
available against individual federal officials for constitutional 
violations.
66
 
On remand, the district court dismissed the Bivens Fourth 
Amendment claim for malicious prosecution and the Fifth Amendment 
claim for due process violations, but did not dismiss the Fifth 
Amendment claim of the government‘s retaliation against Robbins. The 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding 
that Robbins had a right under the Fifth Amendment to be free from 
retaliation for his refusal to give the government an easement.
67
 The 
Court of Appeals allowed Robbins‘s allegations regarding the individual 
actions of the officials to proceed under Bivens. The Court of Appeals 
also allowed the RICO claim to go forward. The Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeals‘ grant of the Bivens action in a 7–2 vote and 
unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals‘ decision to allow the RICO 
claim to go forward.
68
 Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to Robbins, the Court maintained that the lower court should have 
granted the government its motion for summary judgment by denying the 
Bivens action.
69
 Ultimately, Robbins was left without a remedy under 
either claim. 
 
C.  The Court’s Analysis 
 
The Court not only affirmed the power of courts to recognize Bivens 
actions but also recognized that a Bivens remedy is not an entitlement 
after a constitutional violation. The Court held that it must follow a 
―familiar sequence‖70 and used a two-part test to determine whether a 
Bivens action was justified: 
 
[T]here is the question whether any alternative, existing process for 
protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial 
Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in 
damages. But even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is 
a subject of judgment: the federal courts must make the kind of 
remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal,
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2596–97. 
 68. Id. at 2597 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 69. Id. at 2594 n.2; see also id. at 2597 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. at 2598. 
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paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling [sic] 
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.
71
 
 
The Court then analyzed the remedies available to Robbins for each 
category of wrongs he asserted against BLM. For the trespass, the Court 
concluded that even though he chose not to pursue the available tort 
remedies, they were available.
72
 The administrative charges against 
Robbins also had avenues for review.
73
 The Court recognized that 
Robbins did contest various citations and had a jury hear the criminal suit 
against him. The Court found, ―For each charge . . . Robbins had some 
procedure to defend and make good on his position. He took advantage 
of some opportunities, and let others pass; although he had mixed 
success, he had the means to be heard.‖74 The Court reasoned that among 
the government‘s numerous questionable activities, the videotaping of 
ranch guests was ―while no doubt thoroughly irritating and bad for 
business, may not have been unlawful . . . .‖75 Because this and other 
activities may have been legal, no remedy at law needed to exist. The 
Court concluded that Robbins did have an avenue for review or an 
alternative remedy for nearly every claim. The Court, however, did not 
find the existence of an alternative remedy determinative of whether a 
Bivens action was available because the remedy mechanisms were 
piecemeal and not elaborately established by Congress.
76
 
The Court then continued to the second prong of determining 
whether a Bivens action should apply by ―weighing reasons for and 
against the creation of a new cause of action . . . .‖77 The Court seemed to 
empathize with Robbins‘s argument that not one incident with the BLM 
alone justifies the Bivens actions, but taken together the incidents need 
some sort of remedy, or ―death by a thousand cuts‖ would result.78 The 
Court, however, also recognized that the BLM officials may just have 
been working with ―legitimate zeal‖ or ―hard bargaining‖ on behalf of 
the public to obtain an easement for the use of all to access Rock Creek.
79
 
The Court regarded Robbins‘s claims not as alleging that the BLM went 
too far to obtain an easement, but obtaining an easement is itself a lawful 
 
 71. Id. at 2598 (citing Bush, 462 U.S. 367 at 378). 
 72. Id. at 2598. 
 73. Id. at 2597–99. 
 74. Id. at 2599. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2600. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 40, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, No. 06-
219 (Feb. 20, 2007). 
 79. Id. 
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action. The Court concluded that since this was a retaliation case to 
establish a denial of due process claim, Robbins would need to show that 
the officers did not have a valid purpose. The Court saw obtaining an 
easement as a valid purpose and characterized the BLM‘s actions as 
―bargain[ing] hard by capitalizing on their discretionary authority and 
Robbins‘s violations of various permit terms, though truculence was 
apparent on both sides.‖80 
As the Court weighed the factors counseling hesitation, two main 
factors seemed to sway the Court‘s decision to deny the Bivens remedy. 
First, the Court recognized that opening a Bivens claim in a retaliation 
case would open the possibility for a flood of litigation. The Court stated 
that opening retaliation cases to Bivens actions ―would invite claims in 
every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property 
interests, from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations.‖81 The 
second factor the Court stated that dissuaded it from applying Bivens is 
the difficulty of the constitutional inquiry. The Court stated, 
 
The proposal . . . to create a new Bivens remedy to redress such injuries 
collectively on a theory of retaliation for exercising his property right to 
exclude, or on a general theory of unjustifiably burdening his rights . . . 
raises a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of action. A 
judicial standard to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond 
legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work 
out . . . .
82
 
 
Accordingly, the court deemed these factors ample reason to deny 
Robbins the Bivens remedy while shifting the burden of deciding Bivens 
availability onto Congress.
83
 The Court next addressed the RICO claim 
and denied Robbins a remedy under the federal statutory claim as well.
84
 
Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justice Stevens in her dissenting 
opinion that Robbins should have been afforded a Bivens remedy. The 
dissent argued that that the truest intent of Bivens would be to grant such 
a remedy because Robbins has no alternative remedy for ―the relentless 
torment he alleges‖ at the hands of the federal BLM officers.85 Justice 
Ginsburg saw the harassment as more severe than the majority saw it, 
 
 80. Id. at 2604. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2604–05. 
 84. Id. at 2608. 
 85. Id. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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and she did not believe that the campaign against Robbins could just be 
dismissed as hard bargaining. Justice Ginsburg also asserted that the 
majority‘s analysis that retaliation claims would open difficult 
constitutional questions and the floodgate to federal court legislation 
does not provide strong enough reasons to refuse to enforce a 
constitutional right.
86
 Justice Ginsburg concluded that ―where a plaintiff 
could prove a pattern of severe and pervasive harassment in duration and 
degree well beyond the ordinary rough-and-tumble one expects in 
strenuous negotiations, a Bivens suit would provide a remedy. Robbins 
would have no trouble meeting that standard.‖87 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF BIVENS TODAY 
 
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the existence and availability of 
the Bivens remedy when federal officers have violated an individual‘s 
constitutional rights.
88
 In all but two of the Court‘s cases since Bivens, 
however, the Court has refused to apply a Bivens action.
89
 Although it is 
possible for an individual to assert a Bivens claim and receive damages 
for a violation of one of his or her constitutional rights by a federal 
officer, in practice the Court has narrowed the availability of the remedy 
to few circumstances. In Wilkie, Justices Thomas and Scalia in a 
concurring opinion asserted what they asserted in the 2001 Malesko case: 
that Bivens should be limited to its facts, and that it is a ―relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create 
causes of action.‖90 Although the Supreme Court had not affirmed a 
Bivens action since Carlson v. Green in 1980, the lower courts continued 
to apply Bivens.
91
 For example, the Tenth Circuit in Wilkie v. Robbins 
found that Robbins‘s Bivens claim could go forward.92 But in each case 
asserting a Bivens action, the Supreme Court has narrowed its 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2616–17. 
 88. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66 (―Our authority to imply a new constitutional tort, not 
expressly authorized by statute, is anchored in our general jurisdiction to decide all cases ‗arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.‘‖) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1331); Wilkie, 
127 S. Ct. at 2597 (―[W]e have recognized two more nonstautory damages remedies . . . but we have 
also held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to 
represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional  
guarantee . . . .‖). 
 89. See Davis v. Passman, 441 U.S. 228 (1979); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 
(1980). 
 90. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2608  (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 
(Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 91. Shepardizing Bivens reveals that lower courts have followed the Bivens analysis in 576 
cases and distinguished the analysis in 325 cases. 
 92. 433 F.3d 755, 764–65 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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availability.
93
 Under the auspices of using the Bivens exceptions of an 
alternative remedy or special factors counseling hesitation, the Court has 
allowed the exceptions to swallow the rule. A grant of Bivens damages is 
more or less the exception to the rule today, especially after Wilkie. 
Bivens has effectively been limited to its facts and after Wilkie is very 
close to a complete demise. Lower courts will no longer be able to apply 
a Bivens remedy for constitutional wrongs. 
Wilkie improperly limits the Bivens remedy in four ways. First, 
Wilkie strengthens a lower court‘s ability to refuse Bivens actions by 
lessening the requirements for an alternative remedy because the Court 
admits that Robbins does not have an adequate means to receive a 
remedy for the various incidents of harassment that he has endured.
94
 
Even without a meaningful remedy, the Court still denies Robbins the 
Bivens cause of action, which effectively eliminates the original purpose 
of Bivens. Second, the court applies a liberal construction of what 
qualifies as a special factor counseling hesitation. By basing these factors 
on a floodgate analysis and the difficulty of constitutional review, instead 
of the traditional avoidance with military affairs or congressional 
legislation, the factors counseling hesitation can be much broader to deny 
a Bivens cause of action.
95
 It leaves one to wonder what might be a factor 
that does not counsel hesitation in applying a private right of action 
against a federal officer. Third, the Court improperly declines to decide 
whether a constitutional right was in fact violated before deciding how 
the severity of the violation of the right affects the plaintiff‘s receipt of 
damages. Lastly, the Court improperly places its focus in denying the 
Bivens remedy on concerns about legislating; but in doing so the Court 
shows the legislative nature of the Bivens remedy as a matter of federal 
common law. In essence, the Court is doing lip service to Justice 
Brennan‘s initial approach in the Bivens majority, but applying more of a 
Harlan approach in actually deciding the Bivens applicability by 
balancing policy considerations with the severity of the right involved. 
 
A.  Alternative Remedies No Longer Need to be Adequate or Exist 
 
The Court in Wilkie makes a somewhat surprising turn in that it 
recognizes that an adequate alternative does not exist for Robbins, but 
that his availability to receive the Bivens remedy is still precluded. In 
 
 93. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. 
L. REV 1117 (1989); see also Joan Steinman, Backing off Bivens and the Ramifications of This 
Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984). 
 94. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 95. Id. at 2604. 
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Justice Harlan‘s concurrence creating the original Bivens action, it 
seemed clear that the fact that Bivens had no other alternative remedies 
necessitated some kind of remedy for a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.
96
 In Wilkie, however, the Court does not seemed 
overly concerned with the fact that no other adequate remedy exists for 
the onslaught of harassment Robbins has received at the hands of 
overzealous BLM officers. The existence of an alternative remedy had 
always been part of the Court‘s decision to deny a Bivens remedy in the 
past.
97
 In fact, in the Court‘s language allowing the Bivens remedy was 
the assumption unless an alternative remedy existed.
98
 Wilkie allows 
federal courts to deny a Bivens remedy even if no other remedy exists, 
and in doing so eliminates the original purpose of the Bivens remedy—to 
provide a remedy for a violation of a constitutional right by federal 
officers. 
The Court has embraced what Gene Nichol argued was the heart of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s dissent in Carlson v. Green. Nichol argued that 
the Chief Justice‘s dissent focused on the assumption that ―a damages 
remedy is somehow a different or inappropriate method of constitutional 
enforcement compared to other accepted remedies.‖99 This idea also 
stems from the fact that there is a huge debate as to the role of the 
Constitution in judicial enforceability. The decision in Wilkie alludes to 
the argument that it is improper for the courts to remedy a constitutional 
violation by a federal officer if there is any other possible remedy 
available. It does not look to the meaningfulness of that remedy. 
Oddly, the Court was very concerned with the kinds of remedies that 
were available to Robbins.
100
 In the end, the fact that no remedy existed 
for Robbins did not automatically ensure that Robbins would receive the 
Bivens remedy. In oral arguments, the first questions several justices 
asked the attorney representing the BLM were about what remedies were 
 
 96. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 409–410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 97. See Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (finding that the plaintiff had an alternative remedy in 
seeking review in the military system); Bush, 462 U.S. 367 (finding that the federal employment 
system had an elaborate, congressionally created review system for remediating wrongful 
termination); Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (finding that the plaintiff had an alternative remedy in the 
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their Social Security benefits); Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (finding that state tort law remedies were an 
alternative remedy for the private individual who denied a prisoner access to the elevator). 
 98. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 (―In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal 
courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate . . . .). But see Steinman, 
supra note 92, at 339 (―[T]he Court failed in Chappell and Bush to underscore the need for courts to 
assess the constitutional adequacy of legislative remedial schemes before relying on those alternative 
remedies to defeat implication of a Bivens action.‖). 
 99. Nichol, supra note 92, at 1133. Nichol continues to argue that ―arising under‖ jurisdiction 
gives the Court the power to declare damage remedies and not just equitable relief. Id. 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 72–75. 
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available to Robbins.
101
 In the majority opinion, the Court noted all of the 
administrative and judicial remedies that were available to Robbins. In 
Chilicky, the Court declined to provide a Bivens remedy because of an 
elaborate remedial scheme provided for by Congress. In Wilkie, because 
of the nature of the repeated offenses and harassment, one elaborate 
remedial scheme was not available. A Bivens cause of action would have 
provided a federal common law remedial scheme for the violations of 
Robbins‘ rights by federal officers. Because the repeated attempts at 
obtaining a remedy for individual offenses by the BLM officers failed, 
there was only one remedy for all of the wrongs committed against 
Robbins—a Bivens award of monetary damages. In a very real way, for 
Robbins it was damages or nothing. He ended up with nothing. Even 
though the Court was concerned with the remedies available, the 
majority erred by eliminating the importance of the availability of 
another remedy in the analysis of whether Bivens would apply. 
The majority articulates a test which examines whether there are 
―any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a 
convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a . . . 
remedy in damages.‖102 The Court classifies the actions against Robbins 
as ―irritating,‖ but finds the administrative and alternative judicial 
process of state tort law to be available even though the Court agrees that 
there are aggregate claims for relief from a ―period of six years, by a 
series of public officials bent on making life difficult.‖103 The Court finds 
that ―It would be hard to infer that Congress expected the Judiciary to 
stay its Bivens hand [in this situation], but equally hard to extract any 
clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new claim.‖104 Thus, because 
the Court was not convinced that the judicial branch should refrain from 
applying its own remedy in light of the existing process, the Court should 
 
 101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (No. 06-219). 
Justice Ginsburg asked: 
 
[T]here‘s a record here that the district court said there was substantial evidence, enough 
to go to trial, of a pattern of harassing conduct that included trespasses on this man‘s 
lodge and leaving the place in disarray, videotaping the guests, selective enforcement of 
the grazing laws, a whole pattern of things, even asking the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
impound his cattle? This man says, this has been done to me by officers of my 
government. Is there a remedy?‖ 
 
Id. at 8 (Justice Scalia asked: ―[T]he photographing of his guests who he brings onto his ranch to 
hunt and they pay him for that. And then he claims that the BLM follows them just to harass them, 
just taking photographs. What relief could he get for that?‖); id. at 10 (Justice Kennedy asked: ―Does 
he have any action that is other than piecemeal?‖). 
 102. Wilkie, 127 St. Ct. at 2598 (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 2600–01. 
 104. Id. at 2600. 
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have applied the Bivens remedy. Instead, the Court reasoned that the 
decision would be too difficult if it looked at the remedy alone. This 
decision is a departure from previous jurisprudence where the 
presumption rested in favor of granting a Bivens action. 
The Court departs even further from established precedent and 
narrows the availability of Bivens when it states, ―But even in the 
absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment.‖105 
Even though in previous cases some sort of an alternative was always 
available when the Court denied a remedy, in Wilkie no alternative 
remedy even has to exist.
106
 The deterioration first from the Bivens 
remedy to a less effective congressionally stated remedy, and then 
removing the alternative remedy requirement altogether, shows that 
Wilkie is practically limiting Bivens to its facts. The Court now decides 
as a matter of judgment whether the Bivens cause of action will be 
available. Alternative remedies no longer play as significant a role in the 
analysis of whether a Bivens remedy should be applied. Because of this, 
the Court has severely diminished the ability of an individual to receive a 
remedy for a violation of his or her constitutional rights by a federal 
officer. 
 
B.  Widening the Special Factors Counseling Hesitation to Narrow 
Bivens 
 
The judgment that the Court appears to adopt is a balancing test 
between the appropriate remedies provided at common law and whether 
there are any special factors that would counsel hesitation. The historic 
interest in providing monetary damages for invasions of personal liberty 
was established in Bivens itself and has been long accepted as part of 
administering justice.
107
 The special factors counseling hesitation to the 
Court‘s decision to provide monetary remedies seemed in earlier cases to 
be narrow and specific to the facts at hand.
108
 In Wilkie, however, this 
test becomes more legislative than judicial in nature, because the Court 
can now make policy decisions as to whether or not to apply the remedy 
instead of looking solely to the remedies available and assessing whether 
they are adequate. In the Bivens opinion, the dissenters argued that it was 
 
 105. Id. at 2598. 
 106. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 107. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
 108. For instance, in Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the unique nature of the military regime 
was a special factor counseling hesitation. In Bush, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the federal government‘s 
interest in providing an employment scheme and review of that scheme was a special factor 
counseling hesitation. In Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), Congress‘s elaborate remedial scheme for 
denied Social Security benefits was a special factor counseling hesitation. 
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improper for the Court to create a cause of action without express 
congressional authority.
109
 The dissenters in Bivens have prevailed. The 
majority in Wilkie argues, like the dissenters in Bivens, that the Court 
should make the legislative policy decisions about whether or not to 
apply the cause of action in each case, and that congressional authority is 
just one factor to consider in making this judgment.
110
 
In Wilkie, the Court stays true to the words of the Bivens majority 
and its progeny as it looks to what special factors may abound that would 
counsel hesitation. The Court, however, adopts a much broader view of 
what these special factors could be. With such a broad view of what 
factors could preclude a Bivens remedy, the Bivens remedy itself 
becomes almost impossible to apply. The Court adopts two main policy 
reasons why they should avoid granting Robbins a Bivens remedy. The 
first is a fear of opening the floodgates of litigation for those seeking a 
Bivens remedy. The Court explains that ―a Bivens action to redress 
retaliation against those who resist Government impositions on their 
property rights would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate 
governmental action affecting property interests . . . .‖111 The floodgates 
argument is a common concern in federal litigation, but it has not been 
considered a special factor in previous Bivens actions. In her dissent, 
Justice Ginsburg discusses this departure from precedent when she states, 
―The Court finds . . . a special factor counseling hesitation quite unlike 
any we have recognized before.‖112 If the Court takes this to its logical 
extension in future cases, then to apply a Bivens remedy to any 
constitutional violation other than one the Court has already declared 
deserving of the same would open the floodgates to litigation and would 
be barred under this prong of the test. This is not a persuasive special 
factor that should preclude the Court from using its historic power to 
grant a remedy for a violation of a right.
113
 
The second factor that the Court reasons should preclude the 
application of a Bivens remedy is the difficulty of determining whether 
Robbins‘s constitutional rights have been violated by the federal officers. 
This factor bleeds into the floodgates argument because the vagueness of 
 
 109. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
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the constitutional right, the Court believes, would encourage many to 
respond with a Bivens action when they feel the federal government has 
gone too far in negotiations.
114
 The Court explains, ―A judicial standard 
to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimately hard 
bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work out . . . .‖115 The Court 
shies away from making this determination by reasoning that the 
difficulty of inquiry is a factor in and of itself that counsels hesitation. 
This is an insufficient policy reason on which to base the denial of a 
Bivens remedy. Most cases that come before the Supreme Court have 
difficult constitutional questions to resolve. The difficulty in this case of 
deciding whether the retaliatory acts by the federal officers violated 
constitutional rights strikes at the very purpose for why we have a 
Supreme Court. Surely difficult inquiries can be said to appear in any 
case that reaches a court, especially those cases attempting to assert a 
Bivens cause of action. This circular reasoning for denying a Bivens 
remedy does not amount to a special factor counseling hesitation. The 
Court could avoid applying the Bivens remedy by simply finding the 
constitutional violation too difficult of an inquiry. Like the floodgates 
argument, the difficulty of inquiry argument allows the Court to preclude 
a Bivens remedy in almost any situation, if followed to the logical 
extreme. In essence, the special factors are no longer very special, but the 
test has turned into more of an any factors counseling hesitation 
balancing test. 
 
C.  The Severity of the Right Infringed 
 
The broad policy reasons that the Court adopts in refusing a Bivens 
remedy mask the true reason for the Court‘s refusal—the lack of severity 
of a violation of the constitutional right. The Court infers that the 
infringement, if any, of constitutional rights was not severe enough to 
warrant the creation of a new cause of action. The Court is sympathetic 
to Robbins‘s plight, but not enough to allow a remedy. The Court 
classifies the violations as irritating—maybe even lawful—forms of 
―hard bargaining.‖116 In a case without a clear violation of a clear 
constitutional right, the Court is even more reluctant to provide a Bivens 
remedy even though there is no alternative remedy and no traditional 
special factors like a congressional remedial scheme already mandated or 
military procedures. 
 
 
 114. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 115. Id. 
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In the original Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents case, the 
plaintiff was a man who was woken up in the middle of the night by 
armed federal officers, dragged out of bed, forced to stand naked in his 
living room, and then brought into jail without a probable cause and with 
excessive force.
117
 This was a well-defined violation of the plaintiff‘s 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure 
by federal officers. In Wilkie, it is much less clear whether the federal 
officer‘s harassment of Robbins constituted a violation of a precise 
constitutional right. The dissent disagrees with the majority on the 
severity of the right at issue. Justice Ginsburg argues that because there 
is not a congressional scheme or any of the traditional special factors 
counseling hesitation, Robbins should have a right to recover damages 
because he has been a victim of a constitutional violation by a federal 
agent.
118
 
The Court concludes that 
 
There is a world of difference between a popular Bivens remedy for a 
well-defined violation [and] litigation invited because the elements of a 
claim are so unclear that no one can tell in advance what claim might 
qualify or what might not. . . .
119
 The point here is not to deny that 
Government employees sometimes overreach, for of course they 
do . . . . The point is the reasonable fear that a general Bivens cure 
would be worse than the disease.
120
 
 
The Court obviously fears expanding Bivens more than is necessary, 
which could be a valid concern. With the dearth of actual Supreme Court 
opinions upholding the Bivens remedy, this fear is somewhat 
unjustified.
121
 The Court uses the floodgates arguments discussed above 
not to limit the Bivens action from expanding to include severe 
infringements of constitutional rights, but rather to limit infringements of 
rights that the Court determines are inconsequential. 
This discrimination between severe and less severe constitutional 
infringements in deciding whether a Bivens remedy should be applied is 
not sound because it begs the question of what infringements of rights 
are severe enough to be receive a Bivens remedy and because it causes 
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the Court to again draw vague lines. If federal officers violate an 
individual‘s constitutional right, the Court should apply a Bivens remedy. 
The Court should take into account the severity of the violation in 
determining damages for the violation, not in determining whether the 
remedy should be applied at all. 
It is troubling that the Court never reaches a consensus as to whether 
Robbins in actuality suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. 
Without such a consensus, the Court‘s reasoning is circular and denies a 
Bivens remedy prematurely. If Robbins did suffer a violation of a 
constitutional right, the fact that it is a difficult question because it is not 
a severe violation precludes the ability of Bivens to apply for fear of an 
onslaught of Bivens actions. If he did not suffer a constitutional violation, 
then a Bivens remedy does not need to be applied in the first place. The 
Court puts the proverbial cart before the horse by inferring that the right 
violated is not severe enough to warrant a Bivens remedy before 
determining whether the right was violated at all. The Court‘s analysis 
begs the question of what constitutional infringements by a federal 
officer are severe enough to warrant a Bivens remedy. If the BLM 
officers had seized Robbins‘s land without compensation, would the 
Court be more willing to grant Robbins a cause of action to seek 
damages for a direct constitutional violation? What if the BLM officers 
had only seized an inconsequential portion of Robbins‘s land? The 
Court‘s confusing dichotomy of whether the right was infringed and 
whether the right was severe enough to warrant a Bivens action results in 
another illogical limit on Bivens. The Court should have clearly 
determined whether the actions by the BLM agents warranted a remedy 
at all. 
 
D.  The Court’s Legislative Consideration 
 
The Court in Wilkie acts more like a legislature in considering 
whether a Bivens action should apply by weighing and balancing many 
factors: the existence of an alternative remedy, special factors counseling 
hesitation, and the severity of the right infringed. After deciding against 
applying a Bivens remedy, the Court states that Congress should be the 
one to provide a remedy. The Court states: ―We think accordingly that 
any damages remedy for actions by Government employees who push 
too hard for the Government‘s benefit may come better, if at all, through 
legislation.‖122 This hope by a strong majority of the Court is far flung. 
The Court exists to remedy violations of individual rights and, I argue, 
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has the power to do so directly from the Constitution itself.
123
 The power 
of the Bivens cause of action is to provide a remedy for isolated abuses of 
power by federal officers, abuses that directly violate an individual‘s 
constitutional rights. Deferring to Congress to provide for a cause of 
action against federal officers who push too hard in this case is not a 
practical solution, nor is it needed. The Court has the power to apply a 
remedy for a constitutional violation by a federal officer. The Court has 
chosen to punt this responsibility to Congress and in doing so leaves 
individuals without protection against abuses by federal officers. 
Even as the majority of the Court argues that determining a remedy 
in this case is a task for the legislative branch, the Court acts much like a 
legislature in reaching that decision. The Court suggests that future 
decisions as to availability of Bivens remedies can be determined through 
a case-by-case balancing approach, which mirrors Justice Harlan‘s 
original dissent in Bivens. Instead of looking to alternative remedies as 
the main factor, however, the Court‘s current balancing approach looks 
to the possibility of opening the floodgates and the difficulty of 
determining the constitutional right.
124
 Because the Court acts more like 
a legislature in considering these factors, the Court is able to choose 
which factors it finds more important than the other factors. In doing so, 
the Court has veered from the original and most important consideration 
in the Bivens analysis—whether an alternative remedy exists. However, 
the Court, not Congress, created the Bivens remedy, and it is in the 
province of the Court to adapt and change the remedy as it sees fit. In 
changing the importance of the factors, the Court has veered from the 
original purpose of a Bivens action—to remedy a constitutional violation 
by a federal officer. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Wilkie improperly restricts the Bivens action. Not every right 
deserves a remedy, but when a remedy is readily available and the only 
considerations that preclude the remedy from being granted are concerns 
that too many cases seeking a similar remedy for a redress of wrongs, 
and the difficulty of deciding whether a right was really violated, the 
remedy should be granted. Robbins is left without a remedy for the 
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overall harassment he received at the hands of federal officers when one 
could have been easily applied. The proper role for the Court is to apply 
such a remedy when it is available. Instead, the Court denies the remedy 
without deciding whether the right was even violated. 
The future of the Bivens remedies seems to be quite limited. Bivens 
itself is good law. In a case where federal officers clearly violate the 
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff would be able to receive a Bivens remedy 
of damages. The Court in Wilkie establishes that to receive a Bivens 
remedy, there must be (1) no other alternative, (2) no fear that granting a 
Bivens remedy will open the floodgates of litigation, and (3) a clear and 
easily determined violation by the federal officer of a constitutional right. 
The proper role of Congress and the courts will also be an issue in the 
future Bivens actions, because even though the Court defers to Congress 
in this case to establish a cause of action, the Court effectively acts like a 
legislature in deciding that the traditional cause of action is not available. 
In theory, Bivens remedies are still available, but in practical application, 
a Bivens remedy will only be applied in rare, almost extreme 
circumstances. Wilkie v. Robbins shows that when it comes to federal 
officers violating constitutional rights, there might not be a remedy for 
every right—no matter how easy and obvious continued recognition of 
an adequate judicial remedy might seem. 
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